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This paper discovers the roots of symbolical algebra in a three-quarters-of-a-century 
British discussion of sound reasoning, general terms. and signs-a discussion in which 
mathematical and philosophical elements were freely and perhaps inseparably intermingled. 
It establishes, in particular, a link between early-l9th-century symbolical algebra and nomi- 
nalism. Opening with a review of recent attacks on the rigid internal/external dichotomy, 
which underlies much of the modern history of science, the paper also serves as an example 
of the fertility of suspending the dichotomy in pursuit of earlier mathematical subcultures. 
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Dieser Aufsatz enthiillt die Wurzeln der symbolischen Algebra einer drei Vierteljahrhun- 
derte andauernden britischen Diskussion urn klare Beweisfiihrung, allgemeine Begriffe und 
Zeichen-eine Diskussion, in der mathematische und philosophische Elemente groaziigig 
und vielleicht sogar untrennbar vermischt wurden. Sie stem insbesondere eine Verbindung 
her zwischen der symbolischen Algebra des frtihen 19. Jahrhunderts und dem Nominal- 
ismus. Der Aufsatz beginnt mit einem Riickblick auf neuste Angriffe auf die starre internei 
externe Dichotomie, die zu einem grol3en Teil der modernen Wissenschaftsgeschichtsschr- 
eibung zugrundeliegt . Des weiteren liefert er ein Beispiel dafiir. wie fruchtbar es sein kann, 
diese Zweiteilung beim Studium friiherer mathematischer Subkulturen aufzuheben. 
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Cet article retrace les origines de I’algebre symbolique dans un debat. etale en Grande- 
Bretagne sur trois quart de siecle. portant sur la surete du raisonnement, les termes gene- 
raux et les symboles-un debat dans lequel les composantes mathematiques et philosophi- 
ques apparaissent entremeltes. peut-etre inextricablement. Nous Ctablissons. en particulier. 
un lien entre I’algebre symbolique du debut du XIXieme et le nominalisme. Passant d’abord 
en revue les recentes attaques sur la dichotomie internisteiexterniste sous-jacente h une 
bonne partie de I’histoire des sciences contemporaine. cet article exemplifie la fertilite de 
I’elimination de cette dichotomie lot-s de la recherche de sous-cultures mathematiques du 
passe. a: 19X4 Academic he\\. Inc. 
This paper relates the British debate over algebraic foundations of the late 18th 
and early 19th centuries to a philosophical discussion of the nature of general 
reasoning of the same period. It links specifically the symbolical algebra of 
Charles Babbage and George Peacock to the nominalism of George Berkeley 
and Dugald Stewart. 
From a presentist perspective, then, the paper concerns the philosophical roots 
of symbolical algebra. But such a description is not quite correct, for basic to the 
paper is the contention that a rigid distinction between mathematical and philo- 
sophical elements of the I8th- and 19th-century British discussion of reasoning, 
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which helped spawn the symbolical approach, would be anachronistic. Products 
of an environment supportive of intellectual breadth and amateurism over special- 
ization and professionalism, participants in the discussion seem not to have cared 
to sort mathematical from nonmathematical elements. Thus the problem of the 
negative and imaginary numbers-in response to which the symbolical approach 
was offered as a solution [Nagel 1935; Pycior 1981, 27-35]-appears in the peri- 
od’s literature as neither a strictly mathematical problem nor a strictly philosophi- 
cal one, but rather as a major problem in abstract reasoning of interest to all 
serious thinkers. Similarly, mathematical and philosophical elements were freely 
intermingled in responses to the latter problem and to other of the period’s ques- 
tions concerning general terms, signs, and reasoning: as the symbolical algebraists 
drew inspiration from Stewart, so Stewart appealed to abstract algebra as the best 
example of his nominalist position. Thus, while connecting symbolical algebra to 
British nominalism of the 18th and 19th centuries, the paper also illustrates the 
fertility of suspending presentist distinctions between internal and external in the 
pursuit of an understanding of earlier mathematical subcultures. 
INTERNALISM, EXTERNALISM, AND BEYOND 
The decision to abandon the rigid internal/external framework for the present 
study of the roots of symbolical algebra is supported by methodological discus- 
sions of the last decade which have questioned the validity of the framework as an 
analytical tool of the history and sociology of science (e.g., [Barnes 1974; Bloor 
1973, 1976; MacLeod 19771). 
Neither these discussions nor this paper argues for total abandonment of the 
distinction between internal and external factors. Rather, as elaborated by Barry 
Barnes, the newer position assumes that there is no absolute distinction between 
internal and external applicable to all sciences of all historical periods, but that 
relativistic distinctions exist, and that even such relativistic distinctions become 
less clear for some earlier scientific periods. The first two points follow from 
Barnes’ sociological view of science as “a part of culture like any other,” whose 
participants, to varying degrees, “define it as a bounded set of meanings, beliefs 
and activities with an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside.’ ” Thus, for Barnes, the significant 
distinctions are those between internal and external made by the practitioners of 
particular sciences of particular periods. A relativistic distinction is “useful for 
explanatory purposes” because it “is part of the actors’ perception of the situa- 
tion; and action is intelligible only as a response to that perception.” Recognition 
of relativistic distinctions, Barnes contends, represents a departure from the tradi- 
tional internal/external framework which assumes some sort of absolute distinc- 
tion between internal and external factors which the historian knows and which 
the historian can therefore bring to the study of the scientific past. Barnes charac- 
terizes the traditional absolute distinction as a “stipulation,” made in advance of 
immersion in earlier cultures and based on an understanding of science which is 
modern and possibly anachronistic to those cultures. As he explains: 
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Making a demarcation by external standards is useless for explanatory purposes, and 
hence for sociological purposes. Inevitably, it divides patterns of action, intelligible as a 
whole as the “normal practice” of scientists, into “scientific” and “unscientific” parts; 
natural connections in the thought of past scientists are severed. . [Barnes 1974, 99-1001 
For some segments of the scientific past, moreover, even a relativistic distinc- 
tion between internal and external may be inappropriate. Thus, Barnes maintains, 
the culture of a period may preclude neat, disciplinary distinctions. A case in point 
is the Scientific Revolution, as interpreted by Alexandre Koyre. Koyre associated 
the Revolution with the reemergence of Platonism. But is neo-Platonism an inter- 
nal or external factor? “As to whether Platonism is internal or external to sci- 
ence,” Barnes replies, “. . . [Koyre] is equivocal. Clearly it is a philosophical 
development, yet philosophy and science are not fully separate traditions at the 
time-at least science and this philosophy are not” [Barnes 1974, 1081. Barnes 
concludes that Koyre’s interpretation is good history precisely because in this 
instance he did not impose on his materials an artificial distinction between sci- 
ence and nonscience (Platonism). In short, Barnes’ sociological perspective cau- 
tions against application of an absolute internal/external distinction, calls for rela- 
tivistic distinctions, and yet leaves open the possibility that the cultural integrity 
of certain (especially earlier) periods may preclude even the latter. Using the 
example of philosophy, Barnes argues against any absolute internal/external 
framework according to which philosophy would always be classified as outside 
(or inside) science; justifies relativistic distinctions partially through appeal to 
case studies in the history of science which have categorized philosophical ideas 
variously as internal or external to certain scientific subcultures [Barnes 1974, 
109-l 141; and uses the Scientific Revolution, as interpreted by Koyre. as illustra- 
tive of a cultural period where the boundary between a certain philosophical 
school and science was so nebulous as to defy fertile distinction between the two. 
Also coming from a sociological perspective, David Bloor extends the critique 
of the rigid internal/external framework from science to mathematics. Intent on 
developing a “strong programme ” of sociological analysis of mathematics, Bloor 
argues against the realist (Platonic) view of mathematics and for a view of mathe- 
matics as a “social creation.” He attacks realism as the underlying philosophy of 
the traditional internal/external dichotomy. According to realism, mathematics 
has an existence independent of the human mind. But “to think of mathematical 
truths as having an independent existence,” Bloor opines, “is to think of them as 
a structured and bounded territory, with an inside and an outside.” Now this view 
opens to sociological analysis only certain parts of the mathematical discipline- 
essentially those dealing with “how someone gets into the position to do mathe- 
matics” and how mathematical errors occur. Sociological analysis does not apply 
to the “ongoing activity of mathematics” since, assuming the realist view, this “is 
structured by the pre-existing logic of the connections that the mathematician is 
exploring” [Bloor 1973, 177-1781. Cultivation of a “strong programme” of socio- 
logical analysis (penetrating through to the core of mathematics and not restricted 
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to its periphery), then, depends on development and adoption of a nonrealist 
approach. Appealing to Wittgenstein, Bloor begins outlining an alternative ap- 
proach according to which mathematics is a “collection of norms,” “an institu- 
tion,” and “social in nature” [Bloor 1973, 1891. 
Bloor sees Wittgenstein’s view of mathematics as tremendously liberating for 
the sociologist, but not completely destructive of the internal/external dichotomy. 
In agreement with Barnes, he supports relativistic internal/external distinctions. 
Asking specifically whether adoption of Wittgenstein’s approach means that 
“ ‘external history’ rather than ‘internal history’ [will] be the order of the day?,” 
Bloor responds: “No. The extent to which one segment of social life is separated 
from others is itself a social variable. The sociologist must take it as he finds it” 
[Bloor 1973, 190-1911. In summary, Bloor puts aside the realist view of mathemat- 
ics, interprets Wittgenstein as supporting a view of mathematics as a collection of 
norms, and then takes the latter interpretation as license to abandon the tradi- 
tional internal/external dichotomy and pursue a strong programme of sociological 
analysis of mathematics. 
The methodological reflections of Barnes and Bloor are not totally strange to 
historians, many of whom would probably agree on the value of immersion in the 
culture of a period under study. From this perspective, Barnes and Bloor are 
merely advocating that, while immersing themselves in particular scientific sub- 
cultures, historians abide by the differentiation of scientific and nonscientific fac- 
tors made by the subcultures’ members. Yet the timeliness of the reflections of 
Barnes and Bloor should not be overlooked. Their plea for relativistic internal/ 
external distinctions comes at a point when the traditional internal/external frame- 
work seems sometimes an impediment to rather than a productive tool for the 
analysis of science. In recent times, for example, historians of mathematics have 
felt compelled to offer special justifications of and even apologies for the consider- 
ation of philosophical (let alone social and economic) factors which their research 
underscored as essential to an understanding of certain mathematical develop- 
ments. Such apologies are acknowledgments of persistent acceptance of a rigid 
internal/external framework according to which philosophy is an external factor, 
as well as the framework’s inability to accommodate some historical case studies. 
In illustration, modern treatments of Sir William Rowan Hamilton recognize the 
internal/external dichotomy, but then argue at least implicitly for a modification of 
it, similar to that proposed by Barnes and Bloor, as most conducive to an under- 
standing of their subject’s major mathematical and scientific work. Thus, in the 
introduction to his biography of Hamilton, Thomas Hankins seems almost to 
concede the traditional dichotomy: 
Biographers of mathematicians usually describe the accomplishments of their subject inter- 
spersed with biographical information of an anecdotal sort. There seems to be little connec- 
tion between the man’s life (his religious beliefs, his social position, his character, and so on) 
and the mathematical work that he does. The reason is that mathematics is the most “inter- 
nalist” of all the sciences. It has a logical coherence independent of physical events or their 
chronology. 
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Similarly, turning to Hamilton’s famous paper of 1837 in which Kantian philoso- 
phy was intermingled with a new approach to the complex numbers, Hankins 
confesses that “one can argue and it has been so argued that the proper represen- 
tation of complex numbers is an entirely algebraic problem, and that the meta- 
physical trappings in which Hamilton presents his ideas are superfluous adorn- 
ments that actually obscure and interfere with the important mathematical 
content.” Yet the extent of Hankins’ coverage of Hamilton’s Kantianism and its 
possible connections with his mathematics speaks against both the rigid internal/ 
external dichotomy and the categorization of philosophy as an element peripheral 
to mathematics. Indeed, in the biography’s apologia for its detailed coverage of 
Hamilton’s philosophy, Hankins comes close to enunciating a case for relativistic 
internal/external distinctions. Hamilton, he emphasizes, “ did follow Kant, and he 
did describe his system in a paper entitled ‘Preliminary and Elementary Essay on 
Algebra as the Science of Pure Time,’ and he did say that his own philosophy 
greatly affected the course of his mathematical research. . .” [Hankins 1980, 
xviii-xix] [ 11. 
Hankins’ introduction suggests that historians of mathematics are predisposed 
to accept generally and perhaps implicitly a rigid internal/external framework, and 
modify that framework only after frustrating attempts to fit their particular studies 
into it. But, then, is the framework a fertile analytical tool or a set of blinders, 
possibly causing historians, as Barnes contends, to miss “natural connections in 
the thought of past scientists” [Barnes 1974, loo]? It seems likely that analysis of 
some mathematical developments would improve with early adoption of a skepti- 
cal attitude toward an absolute internal/external dichotomy. 
“IMPOSSIBLE NUMBERS” AND THE NATURE OF ABSTRACT 
REASONING 
This paper began with a glimmer of a relationship between symbolical algebra 
and nominalism, and a conscious decision to use the relativistic internal/external 
framework, advocated by Barnes and Bloor, in pursuit of this relationship. The 
paper explores the development of British symbolical algebra in the pre-1830 
period; it analyzes the major problem from which the symbolical approach 
emerged and early justifications of the approach. Taking advantage of the freedom 
offered by the relativistic framework, the paper argues for a new interpretation of 
the roots of symbolical algebra: that symbolical algebra emerged out of a long- 
continuing British discussion of sound reasoning, abstraction, meaning, general 
terms, and signs, a discussion whose mathematical and philosophical elements 
were intimately and perhaps inseparably connected. 
As many historians agree, British symbolical algebra arose in response to the 
problem of the negative and imaginary numbers. These numbers-introduced into 
Western Europe during the Renaissance and by the 18th century used rather 
liberally in mathematics- were recognized by British mathematicians as particu- 
larly troublesome flaws in algebra from the mid-18th century on. Three mathema- 
ticians, the Scotsman Robert Simson and the Englishmen Francis Maseres and 
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William Frend, aroused British uneasiness about the negatives and imaginaries. 
They exposed the lack of adequate definitions of these numbers and called for 
their expulsion from algebra. In the early 19th century, acknowledging the role of 
these three dissident mathematicians in highlighting the problem of the negative 
and imaginary numbers, George Peacock and other British algebraists proposed, 
as a resolution of the problem, the symbolical approach to algebra-with its 
meaningless symbols and signs [Nagel 1935; Pycior 1981, 27-351. 
This standard account of the problem of the negative and imaginary numbers as 
a stimulus to development of the symbolical approach, however, misses a crucial 
point. The rejection of the negative (and hence imaginary) numbers took place in a 
particular philosophical context, a traditional one which posited physical or ideal 
backing for all general terms. The theory of abstraction of Frend (the opponent of 
the negatives whose career and opinions are most familiar to historians), for 
example, seems to have approximated the conceptualism of John Locke [2]. 
Frend’s private letters show that, although he distrusted most philosophers 
[Frend 18361, he sanctioned his daughter’s study of Locke’s Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding [Frend 18211. More substantially, the letters reveal a be- 
lief in the empirical foundations of knowledge [Frend 18291 and the view of gen- 
eral words as signs of general ideas, presumably derived by the human mind from 
particulars [Frend 18241. Along with Locke, Frend also saw “the ideas of number 
. [as] the clearest and most distinct in the human mind. . .” [Frend 1796-1799 
i ,-ix]. 
Frend and Maseres sometimes explicitly built their case against the negatives 
on the requirement that for every general term there be a general idea. Thus in a 
paper presented to the Royal Society of London, Maseres attacked the negative 
and imaginary numbers as “a parcel of algebraick quantities, of which our under- 
standings cannot form any idea” [Maseres 1778, 9471; in his later appendix to 
Frend’s Principles ofAlgebra, he used similar language to reiterate his point that 
“the quantities called negative are such as it is impossible to form any clear idea 
of” (in [Frend 1796-1799 I, 46.51). Similarly-following his blanket dismissal of 
general terms without ideal backing as parrots’ gabble [Frend 1824]-Frend de- 
nounced negative numbers specifically as “jargon, at which common sense recoils 
. . . ) like many other figments . . . [finding] the most strenuous support among 
those who love to take things upon trust, and hate the labour of a serious thought” 
[Frend 1796-1799 1, xi]. 
Elaborating their case against the negatives as meaningless terms, Maseres and 
Frend explored the pitfalls of reasoning on such terms. Maseres described such 
reasoning as “mysterious and fantastick,” and added that it might more appropri- 
ately be called “discoursing, since it deserves not to be called reasoning” (in 
[Frend 1796-1799 1,254]). Frend, on the other hand, pursued the consequences of 
applying sound reasoning to the negatives. He argued on one occasion that such 
reasoning would probably lead to false conclusions [Frend 1796-1799 1, 2121. 
Later, more drastically, he claimed that “from false notions, falsehood must 
necessarily flow, if the reasoning employed upon them has been properly con- 
ducted” [Frend 1798, 31. 
430 HELENA M. PYCIOR HM II 
Despite such arguments against the negatives and imaginaries, many British 
thinkers supported their retention as useful mathematical entities. In the debate 
over these numbers, which stretched into the early 19th century, then, their 
supporters emphasized the point that reasoning on the negatives and imaginaries 
seemed to lead to true conclusions, and at least one, Robert Woodhouse, finally 
argued that logic rather than meaning was crucial to sound reasoning. With the 
latter realization, the stage was set for the symbolical approach, according to 
which algebra was seen as the deductive study of meaningless signs and symbols. 
One of the early defenders of the imaginaries was John Playfair, whose paper of 
1778 tried to legitimate these numbers through appeal to analogy. Paralleling 
Maseres’ introduction to his Dissertation on the Use of the Negative Sign in 
Algebra [Maseres 1758, ii-iii], Playfair opened his paper by comparing algebra 
unfavorably with geometry. Geometry, he argued, was free of difficulties because 
the geometer always kept before him particular representatives of general ideas-if 
reasoning about lines, for example, he drew a line and that visual representation of 
the general idea prevented contradictions and other problems. Algebraic reason- 
ing, however, was quite different and less satisfactory. 
In algebra again every magnitude being denoted by an artificial symbol, to which it has no 
resemblance, is liable, on some occasions, to be neglected, while the symbol may become the 
sole object of attention. It is not perhaps observed where the connection between them ceases 
to exist, and the analyst continues to reason about the characters after nothing is left which 
they can possibly express. [Playfair 1778. 318-3191 
In agreement with Maseres, Playfair denied the designations of “reasoning” and 
“science” to the kind of algebra described above. “The name of reasoning,” he 
wrote, “cannot be given to a process into which no idea is introduced.” Later, he 
reiterated that “the arithmetic of mere characters can have no place in a science 
which is immediately conversant with ideas” [Playfair 1778. 320-3211. 
Nevertheless Playfair did not support abandonment of the negative and imagi- 
nary numbers. He was too impressed by the usefulness of the imaginaries, and 
particularly by the fact that some conclusions reached through manipulations on 
these numbers were independently confirmed by geometry. Turning the tables 
briefly, he hinted at the need for a reevaluation of the reasoning process which 
took into consideration the paradoxical utility of the imaginaries: 
Here then is a paradox which remains to be explained. If  the operations of this imaginary 
arithmetic are unintelligible, why are they not also useless? Is investigation an art so mechani- 
cal, that it may be conducted by certain manual operations? or is truth so easily discovered. 
that intelligence is not necessary to give success to our researches? These are difficulties 
which it is of some importance to resolve, and on which much attention has not hitherto been 
bestowed. [Playfair 1778, 321) 
Playfair’s concern for this paradox subsided as he explained the imaginary 
numbers (to his own satisfaction) through appeal to analogy [Playfair 1778, 3261. 
Nearly a quarter-century later, however, Robert Woodhouse revived the problem 
of reasoning on the imaginary numbers, almost exactly as Playfair had framed it. 
Thus Woodhouse sought to reconcile the meaninglessness of these numbers with 
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their utility. In the solution of this paradox, he departed significantly from Play- 
fair: he rejected justification by analogy and chose instead to scuttle the criterion 
that good reasoning deal with significant ideas. In short, he offered the germs of 
the symbolical approach. 
Woodhouse’ paper opened with a summary of the major philosophical assump- 
tion underlying the attack on the negatives and imaginaries-that general ideas 
were a prerequisite for general terms and for sound reasoning-an assumption 
which was rejected by the paper’s end. As Woodhouse explained: 
The arguments that seem to render all operations performed with impossible [imaginary] 
quantities unintelligible, may be included under the following statement. Algebra is a species 
of short-hand writing; a language, or system of characters or signs, invented for the purpose 
of facilitating the comparison and combination of ideas. Now all demonstration by signs, 
must ultimately rest on observations made on individual objects; and all the varieties of the 
transformation and combination of signs, except what are arbitrary and conventional, must be 
regulated by properties observed to belong to the things of which the signs are the representa- 
tives. Demonstration by signs is shown to be true, by referring to the individual things the 
signs represent. . 
Alluding to Playfair’s earlier paper, Woodhouse seemed to concur in the point that 
true conclusions based on imaginary numbers would be paradoxical according to 
the above philosophical position. But he refused to make this philosophical as- 
sumption the starting point of his analysis of the negatives and imaginaries. In- 
stead he took the utility of these numbers as a universally accepted premise, and 
argued backward from their usefulness to their legitimation. “From the very 
concessions of the mathematicians that have opposed the use of impossible quan- 
tities,” he began, 
is to be derived a powerful argument . . . [for] impossible quantities. . . It is conceded, 
and mentioned as a paradox, that the conclusions obtained by the aid of imaginary quantities 
are most true and certain. Now, if operations with any characters or signs lead to just 
conclusions, such operations must be true by virtue of some principle or other. . . 
[Woodhouse 1801, 901 
The core of Woodhouse’ paper was then devoted to justification of the imagi- 
naries by emphasis on the formal aspects of mathematical reasoning rather than 
on the meanings of terms reasoned upon. Woodhouse’ first main point was that 
the laws governing the complex numbers were the same as those governing the 
real numbers. Mathematicians, he noted, proved the rules of the reals, such as (a 
+ b)(c + d) = UC + ad + bc + bd. But development of similar rules for the 
complex numbers proceeded quite differently. Taking the example of the search 
for a rule governing the multiplication of two complex numbers, Woodhouse 
contended that 
nothing can be aftirmed concerning the product of (a + bk?), and (c + dfl) . . . all that 
can be meant by the form (a + bV?) x (c + dfl) is, that the characters are to be 
combined after the same manner that the signs of real quantities are; so that (a + bfl) x 
(c + Lifl), and ac + ad- + cb%‘? - bd, are two forms equivalent to each other, not 
proved equivalent, but put so, by extending the rule demonstrated for the signs of real 
quantities to characters that are insignificant. [Woodhouse 1801, 931 
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After making this first point-and in the process, anticipating Peacock’s principle 
of the permanence of equivalent forms [Pycior 1981. 36-38]-Woodhouse en- 
gaged in a discussion of reasoning, out of which emerged his second main conten- 
tion that sound reasoning did not depend on significates of general terms. Restrict- 
ing his initial discussion to reasoning on terms with ideal backing, he noted that 
when the characters employed are signs of ideas. or representatives of real things; 
demonstration would be defined to be, [ 11 a method of shewing the agreement of remote ideas 
by a train of intermediate ideas. each agreeing with that next it; or, in other words, [2] a 
method of tracing the connection between certain principles and a conclusion, by a series of 
intermediate and identical propositions. each proposition being converted into its next. by 
changing the combination of signs that represent it, into another shewn to be equivalent to it. 
[Woodhouse 1801, 106-1071 
The signification of general terms is mentioned nowhere in the second part of this 
description of sound reasoning; rather, according to the second part, demonstra- 
tion proceeds by conversion of one combination of signs into the next according to 
prescribed rules. Putting together the main points of this section, then, 
Woodhouse concluded that manipulations on the imaginaries were legitimate pre- 
cisely because such manipulations involved sound reasoning based on the laws of 
the reals. “Hence,” he wrote, “although the symbol fl be beyond the power of 
arithmetical computation, the operations in which it is introduced are intelligible, 
and deserve, if any operations do, the name of reasoning” [Woodhouse 1801, 
1081. In short, Woodhouse saved the useful imaginaries by clarifying the point that 
demonstration depended primarily on the rules governing general terms rather 
than on the meanings of such terms. From this perspective, the lack of ideal 
backing for an imaginary number was inconsequential. 
In 1808, Playfair reentered the controversy surrounding the imaginaries. He set 
the problem in a large philosophical context; again underscored the “paradox” of 
the utility of the imaginary numbers; rejected earlier explanations of these num- 
bers, including Woodhouse’; and presented somewhat tentatively his original de- 
fense of the imaginaries by analogy. In this second paper, Playfair seems to have 
sought primarily to highlight the problem of the algebra of the imaginaries as one 
deserving “the attention, not of mathematicians only, but of all philosophers who 
would study the influence which SIGNS have on the formation of ideas, and the 
acquisition of knowledge.” Algebra, he noted, was a language of signs invented 
specifically to help the mind manage thought, and, as such, was the extreme case 
of “the direct influence of signs on the operations of the mind” [Anon. 1808, 3061. 
Moreover, the imaginaries made algebra even more interesting and complicated as 
a language including signs with no ideal backing. 
Playfair maintained steadfastly that, although the imaginaries were useful, no 
meaning could be assigned to these numbers or to operations’on them. He inter- 
preted Woodhouse’ defense of the imaginaries to rest on the contention that, 
while these numbers were meaningless, operations on them were meaningful, 
since they were the same operations as those derived for the reals. Taking a 
specific example of division by an imaginary, Playfair countered: 
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we certainly did not really perform division; for what is meant by dividing by an impossible 
quantity, or telling how often an impossible quantity contains another; if the quantity be 
impossible, to multiply or divide by it, or to make it the subject of any arithmetical operation, 
must be impossible also. The operations performed with the symbols are therefore destitute 
of meaning; they are as imaginary as the symbols themselves. . [Anon. 1808, 3151 
But where did admission of the meaninglessness of imaginary numbers and their 
operations leave British thinkers? First and perhaps foremost in Playfair’s opin- 
ion, the paradox of the imaginaries-that symbols without significates could yield 
true results-was extraordinary evidence of the power of signs, “a triumph which 
the imagination of the most sanguine nominalist could never have anticipated.” 
Playfair, however, was not satisfied with this conclusion; he sought “the real 
principle” underlying the algebraists’ successful manipulation of the imaginaries. 
As he argued, true results based on the imaginaries could not be attributed to 
chance or random manipulation. The existence of an underlying principle was 
therefore undeniable, although its nature might be unclear. At this point, Playfair 
tentatively revived his original explanation of the imaginary numbers through 
analogy [Anon. 1808, 316-3171. 
This second paper of Playfair’s was not the last British article devoted primarily 
to the problem of the negative and imaginary numbers. Such articles continued to 
appear right up through publication of Peacock’s Treatise on Algebra, which as 
the first published formulation of the symbolical approach eventually put to rest 
the problem of impossible numbers. At the end of 1830, for example, in perhaps 
the last noteworthy article on the problem, Davies Gilbert, then outgoing Presi- 
dent of the Royal Society of London, took a turn at justifying the negatives and 
imaginaries. Gilbert, although a mathematical layman, admitted that the problem 
had occupied his attention “for many years.” He then offered different explana- 
tions for the negatives and for the imaginaries. The distinction between positive 
and negative he attributed to the relationship existing between the same quantity 
taken in opposite directions [Gilbert 1831, 91-921. Offering no physical or ideal 
backing for the imaginaries, however, he described these numbers as “creations 
merely of arbitrary definition, endowed with properties at the pleasure of him that 
defines them, the whole dispute respecting imaginary quantities turning on the 
point contested from the earliest times between the hostile sects of Realists and 
Nominalists. . . .” While the imaginaries were impossible from the realist per- 
spective, he added, they were quite acceptable from the nominalist perspective. In 
short, for Gilbert, the imaginaries were no longer problematic to good reasoning 
because nominalism was “the theory . . . so universally prevalent as scarcely to 
admit of a single exception among all those who make the powers of the human 
mind the subject of their peculiar research. . .” [Gilbert 1831, 93-941. 
Thus, in the course of a three-quarters-of-a-century controversy over the nega- 
tive and imaginary numbers, British thinkers had moved from insistence on ideal or 
physical backing for all general terms as basic to sound reasoning, to acceptance 
of idealless terms governed by prescribed rules-the germ of the symbolical ap- 
proach. Alternatively, as Gilbert saw it, the philosophical context of mathematics 
had changed from conceptualist (or, for some, realist) to nominalist. 
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BRITISH NOMINALISM AND SYMBOLICAL ALGEBRA 
The suggestion by Playfair and Gilbert of a connection between nominalism and 
a new approach to algebra, which accepted idealless terms governed by assigned 
rules, acquires more credence as the intellectual debts of some of the period’s key 
mathematicians are explored. The algebraic writings of Woodhouse, perhaps the 
major forerunner of the symbolical algebraists, and of Babbage, according to some 
historians, the first of the symbolical algebraists [Dubbey 1978, 93-1301, ac- 
knowledge and show the influence of two major British thinkers whose publica- 
tions ranged over philosophy and mathematics and whose positions on mean- 
ing were sometimes described in their own period as nominalist. Thus George 
Berkeley seems to have helped shape Woodhouse’ views on meaning and reason- 
ing, and Dugald Stewart served a comparable role for Babbage. 
Woodhouse’ debt to Berkeley is demonstrated through the former’s occasional 
borrowing of language from the latter’s writings: Woodhouse’ endorsement of 
Berkeley’s Analyst (1734) as good reading for students: and, finally, shared views 
on the nature of reasoning and algebra. In his paper of 1801, for example, 
Woodhouse quoted from The Analyst: of Playfair’s defense of the imaginaries by 
analogy, he wrote that such an explanation did not satisfy “mathematicians, who, 
in questions of abstract science, profess never to rest contented with ‘a rational 
and moral persuasion’. . .” [Woodhouse 1801. 91-921. The last phrase came 
from Berkeley’s dismissal of induction and authority in mathematics as “sufficient 
to beget a rational faith and moral persuasion, but nothing higher” [Berkeley 
1948-1957 4, 941. Woodhouse’ general approval of The Analyst was expressed 
less subtly in his Principles c~f‘Analytic~rr1 Calculation of 1803. Here, he commended 
The Analyst and those writings that it had generated “as forming the most satis- 
factory controversial discussion in pure science, that ever yet appeared.” Contin- 
uing his quite extraordinary endorsement, he added, “If. for the purpose of habit- 
uating the mind to just reasoning. (and mental discipline is all the good the 
generality of students derive from the mathematics) I were to recommend a book, 
it should be the Analyst” [Woodhouse 1803, xvii-xviii]. Here, once again, the 
boundary between mathematics and philosophy was blurred, as Woodhouse sug- 
gested The Ancrlyst (a book dealing with mathematics, philosophy, and religion) as 
the best means of training students’ mental powers-the accepted primary goal of 
mathematics in the Cambridge curriculum of the late 18th and early 19th centu- 
ries. 
Analysis of Berkeley’s views on meaning, reasoning, and algebra shows that the 
bishop’s writings, including The Analyst, offered Woodhouse the basic elements 
of an understanding of algebra as a language of signs whose rational legitimacy 
depended on the rules governing manipulation of the signs rather than on ideas 
behind the signs. Classified variously as a conceptualist or a nominalist ([Woozley 
1967, 199 (conceptualist); Stewart 1814 1, 186; Baum 1972, 119 (nominalist)], e.g.), 
Berkeley followed Locke’s theories of abstraction and meaning, but only up to a 
point. He departed from Locke primarily in the theory of meaning where he 
admitted that it was possible to use general terms without constantly reflecting on 
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the ideas behind them and that some general terms had no ideal backing. Interest- 
ingly, Berkeley supported the latter two claims with examples from algebra. In his 
Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Understanding (1710), he noted that 
“in algebra . . . though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to 
proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your 
thoughts, that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for” [Berkeley 194% 
1957 2, 371. Writing later in Alciphron (1732), he added that “the algebraic mark, 
which denotes the root of a negative square, hath its use in logistic operations, 
although it be impossible to form an idea of any such quantity. And what is true of 
algebraic signs is also true of words or language, modern algebra being in fact a 
more short, apposite, and artificial sort of language. . .” [Berkeley 1948-1957 3, 
3071 131. 
The Analyst-which Woodhouse definitely studied in detail-contained rudi- 
ments of Berkeley’s nominalist view of algebra, as outlined above, along with 
emphasis on the logical component of mathematics. Thus, in Query 27 of The 
Analyst, Berkeley assumed the legitimacy of algebraic symbols without signifi- 
cates, and pondered 
whether because, in stating a general case of pure algebra, we are at full liberty to make a 
character denote either a positive or a negative quantity, or nothing at all, we may therefore, 
in a geometrical case, limited by hypotheses and reasonings from particular properties and 
relations of figures, claim the same licence? [Berkeley 1948-1957 4, 981 
If signification of characters was not essential to all mathematics, then what was? 
Berkeley urged attention to the logic of mathematics in a section of The Analyst 
devoted to the “unaccountable paradox” that the fluxions led to true conclusions. 
“I consider,” he wrote, “the geometrical analyst as a logician, i.e. so far forth as 
he reasons and argues; and his mathematical conclusions, not in themselves, but 
in their premises; not as true or false, useful or insignificant, but as derived from 
such principles, and by such inferences” [Berkeley 1948-1957 4,761. In short, the 
nominalist tendencies of Berkeley most likely bolstered Woodhouse’ description 
of algebra as “a system of characters entirely of . . . [mathematicians’] own 
invention” [Woodhouse 1801, 1191 and his emphasis on logic over meaning. 
The original formulators of the symbolical approach, Babbage and Peacock, 
came under the influence of the nominalist perspective on meaning and reasoning 
at least partially through the writings and teachings of Woodhouse. But, perhaps 
more importantly, the perspective was reinforced through Babbage’s contact with 
the self-avowed Scottish nominalist, Dugald Stewart. The sway of Stewart’s nom- 
inalism over Babbage provided a powerful link between British nominalism of the 
18th and early 19th centuries and early British symbolical algebra. Written under 
the influence of Stewart’s Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Bab- 
bage’s unpublished “Essays on the Philosophy of Analysis” outlined the essential 
points of the symbolical approach and, as Dubbey has shown, probably inspired 
Peacock’s Treatise on Algebra [Dubbey 1978, 93-1301. 
There was a strong attachment between Babbage and Stewart, cemented by 
intellectual and personal bonds. Babbage seems to have been favorably disposed 
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toward Stewart’s Elements even before the two men met in Edinburgh in 1819 
[Babbage 18191. Later, in the chatty correspondence following their meeting and 
in his “Philosophy of Analysis,” Babbage explicitly acknowledged an intellectual 
debt to Stewart. In a letter of 1821 to the Scottish philosopher’s family, for 
example, Babbage recorded that Stewart’s Elements had helped to shape his 
views on analysis, and expressed the hope that Stewart would critically evaluate 
the “Philosophy of Analysis”-the embodiment of those views [Babbage 1821, 
3271. Eventually, personal ties mingling with intellectual filiation, Babbage named 
one of his sons Edward Stewart, after his close friend and associate in the Analyti- 
cal Society, Edward Ffrench Bromhead, and after his Scottish analytical mentor. 
Babbage’s “Essays on the Philosophy of Analysis” was inspired by Stewart’s 
call for a work on the logic of mathematics, as well as based on Stewart’s nominal- 
ist position. In notes at the end of the unpublished essays, Babbage cited specific 
pages of Volume 1 of Stewart’s Elements: pages 48 and 56, which, according to 
Babbage’s annotation, dealt with invention; and page 172, which dealt with ab- 
straction [Babbage n.d., 1451. On page 48, Stewart began a discussion of the 
importance of scientists’ developing a “system of logic,” which he later described 
as laying “down the rules of investigation which it is proper to follow in the 
different sciences” [Stewart 1814 1, 48-491. Page 56, of more relevance to Bab- 
bage, contained a special plea for a “logic of mathematics.” Here, Stewart-who 
had held consecutive professorships in mathematics and moral philosophy at 
Edinburgh-observed that the 
varied, abstruse, and general [mathematical] investigations of the moderns, stand in need 
. of the guidance of philosophical principles: not only for enabling us to conduct, with 
skill, our particular researches, but for directing us to the different methods of reasoning, to 
which we ought to have recourse on different occasions. A collection of such rules 
would probably contribute greatly to the advancement of all those branches of knowledge. to 
which mathematical learning is subservient. [Stewart 1814 1. 561 
Babbage’s “Philosophy of Analysis” was intended as the “logic of mathematics” 
envisioned by Stewart. This point is supported not only by Babbage’s citation of 
the above-described pages of Stewart’s Elements, but also by a preface added to 
the “Philosophy of Analysis” when Babbage sought serial publication of his es- 
says in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society. The preface 
made clear Babbage’s major goal of applying the philosophy of the mind to mathe- 
matics and thereby elucidating the various modes of mathematical discovery 
[Babbage n.d., 5-61 (for exact quotation, see [Dubbey 1978, 97-9811. 
Babbage’s second citation-of page 172-shows that he found in Stewart’s 
Elements more than motivation for his essays. This page is in the middle of the 
first major section in which Stewart outlined his nominalist stance. Going beyond 
Berkeley, Stewart argued that the human mind formed no’ general concepts. 
“Why then should we suppose,” he asked, “that in our general speculations, 
there must exist in the mind some object of its thoughts, when it appears that there 
is no evidence of the existence of any such object, even when the mind is em- 
ployed about individuals?” [Stewart 1814 1, 1901. General truths, then, were 
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merely statements about classes of individuals possessing common qualities. Gen- 
eral reasoning-the path to such general truths-was reasoning on signs, and took 
either of two forms: the “geometrical” or the “algebraical.” Geometrical reason- 
ing used an individual of a class as the representative (or sign) of all the individuals 
in the class; algebraical reasoning, on the other hand, used a “generic word” 
which applied in common to all the individuals of a class, but bore no resemblance 
to those individuals. Thus the geometer drew lines, triangles, and the like, while 
the algebraist reasoned on arbitrary symbols. While admitting that these two kinds 
of reasoning were quite similar, Stewart yet expressed a preference for the alge- 
braical . 
As the decision of a judge must necessarily be impartial, when he is only acquainted with the 
relations in which the parties stand to each other, and when their names are supplied by 
letters of the alphabet . . . so, in every process of reasoning, the conclusion we form is most 
likely to be logically just, when the attention is confined solely to signs; and when the 
imagination does not present to it those individual objects which may. warp the judgment by 
casual associations. [Stewart 1814 I, 172-1731 
Refusing to recognize general conceptions and instead sanctioning reasoning on 
signs in suspension of any consideration of their significates, Stewart faced the 
problem touched on earlier by Berkeley: On what, then, did the legitimacy of such 
algebraical reasoning depend? Stewart’s response was an elaboration of Berke- 
ley’s suggestion that sound reasoning was no more than the logical derivation of 
conclusions from premises. Confining his initial discussion to syllogistic reason- 
ing, Stewart noted that the force of such reasoning depended by no means on 
“particular notions” annexed to the terms of the premises. Rather, he argued, 
all the rules of logic, with respect to syllogisms, might be demonstrated, without having 
recourse to any thing but the letters of the alphabet; in the same manner, (and I may add, on 
the very same principles), on which the algebraist demonstrates, by means of these letters, 
the various rules for transposing the terms of an equation. [Stewart 1814 1, 1751 
Later, in an elaboration on the nature of arithmetic and algebra, Stewart reiterated 
his formal view of algebraic rules. Thus, an algebraic equation, he stated at this 
point, was not “a proposition asserting the equality of two quantities,” but rather 
“a proposition asserting the equivalence of two expressions of the same quan- 
tity.” Algebraic rules, he implied, came from arithmetic, since algebra was 
“merely a universal arithmetic” [Stewart 1816 2, 351. 
Along with emphasis on its logical and formal aspects, however, Stewart admit- 
ted that reasoning was not the only intellectual process involved in the “investiga- 
tion of truth.” Formal manipulation of signs could lead to “paradoxical and 
absurd conclusions” or “speculative absurdities.” Therefore the mind had to 
check general reasoning through interpretation. “Abstracting entirely from the 
ambiguity of language; and supposing also our reasonings to be logically accu- 
rate,” he warned, “it would still be necessary for us, from time to time, in all our 
speculations, to lay aside the use of words, and to have recourse to particular 
examples, or illustrations, in order to correct and to limit our general conclu- 
sions” [Stewart 1814 I, 177-1781. 
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This shift in the theory of meaning, reflected in Stewart’s Elements, had a 
revolutionary impact on the early-19th-century British algebraists, especially Bab- 
bage and Peacock. Stewart’s denial of general concepts vitiated the supposed 
dependence of sound reasoning on clear and distinct general ideas. In particular, 
the denial ended the search for general ideas behind the negative and imaginary 
numbers. More constructively, Stewart offered algebra as the best example of 
general reasoning. In so doing, he put British algebraists on the offensive: in place 
of defenses of the negatives and imaginaries, there now appeared the bold asser- 
tions of Babbage and Peacock of a new approach to algebra which justified these 
numbers. Also, Stewart’s view of algebra was close to the symbolical. For him, 
algebraic reasoning was the formal manipulation-devoid of consideration of 
meaning- of signs bearing no resemblance to the individual objects which they 
represented. Such reasoning was to be checked and controlled through interpreta- 
tion. It was then but a small step to the algebraists’ formulation of symbolical 
algebra as a science of arbitrary symbols and signs-standing for various quanti- 
ties-governed essentially by the rules of arithmetic. Reminiscent of Stewart, 
Peacock even called algebraic rules “equivalent forms” [Peacock 1830, 1041 and 
argued that interpretation of the signs and symbols of algebra would follow and 
not precede their manipulation [Peacock 1833, 1951. 
CONCLUSION 
In the present study of the roots of early-19th-century symbolical algebra, aban- 
donment of a strict internal/external framework offered historical freedom to 
investigate related reflections on the nature of general terms, signs, and reasoning 
in diverse works by Frend, Maseres, Playfair, Woodhouse, Gilbert, Berkeley, and 
Stewart; and then to compare these reflections with one another and with those 
ideas essential to the symbolical approach as formulated by Babbage and Pea- 
cock. Free of the necessity of imposing rigid internal/external distinctions, the 
paper was able to recover these works as parts of a three-quarters-of-a-century 
dialogue on general terms and sound reasoning in which major British thinkers 
intricately interwove mathematical and philosophical insights. Furthermore, the 
paper showed the dialogue as leading to radical interrelated conclusions for both 
mathematics and philosophy. Thus the dialogue evidenced movement from 
Locke’s conceptualism and a traditional view of algebra according to which the 
negative and imaginary numbers were objectionable, to Stewart’s brand of nomi- 
nalism and symbolical algebra. Most interestingly, the mathematics changed along 
with the philosophy, and vice versa. The traditional view of algebra was compati- 
ble with conceptualism, while symbolical algebra not only fit well into and drew 
support from the nominalist framework but also-in a sketchy form-served as 
the chief example of nominalism for both Berkeley and Stewart [Stewart 1814 1, 
182-1831. 
In addition to salvaging the intellectual integrity of the British dialogue on 
general terms and sound reasoning of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, this 
new interpretation of the roots of the symbolical approach [4] helps explain a 
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number of current anomalies in the history of early-19th-century British algebra. 
On an individual level, why did Peacock’s letter of support for Babbage’s early 
candidacy for the professorship of mathematics at the University of Edinburgh 
stress (but not distinguish between) Babbage’s philosophical and mathematical 
accomplishments? [Peacock 1819, 1551. More substantially, why was the problem 
of the negative and imaginary numbers incompatible with its solution? Frend and 
Maseres asked for a clear idea of the negatives; Babbage and Peacock responded 
by asserting that algebra involved operations on arbitrary symbols and so included 
the negative and imaginary numbers. Clearly the symbolical response did not 
meet Frend’s and Maseres’ objection. The problem and its solution each fit a 
different philosophical context: for a conceptualist (or realist), the question raised 
by Frend and Maseres was a good one; for a nominalist, the symbolical response 
was sound. Third, why did William Whewell’s Mechanical Euclid attack Dugald 
Stewart’s views on the nature of mathematics? Whewell accused Stewart of 
“declaring that mathematical truth is hypothetical, and must be understood as 
asserting only, that if the definitions are assumed, the conclusion follows.” In 
Whewell’s opinion, Stewart’s view “prevailed widely among other modern 
speculators on the same subject, especially among mathematicians themselves” 
[Whewell 1837, 1471. This view, according to Whewell, however, was seriously 
flawed: Whewell came under the influence of philosophical frameworks other than 
nominalism (including Platonism and Kantianism) and hence believed that con- 
ceptions, rather than arbitrary definitions, were fundamental to science and math- 
ematics. Last, why did Sir William Rowan Hamilton so carefully elaborate a 
Kantian view of algebra as the science of pure time? Added to Hamilton’s strong 
abiding interest in philosophy, the new interpretation suggests, was his realization 
that the debate over algebraic foundations of the late 18th and early 19th centuries 
was also a debate over broad rival philosophical positions. 
NOTES 
I. In a similar use of the internal/external dichotomy relative to Hamilton, Pycior, probing Hamil- 
ton’s philosophical and poetica interests, describes them as external, but then defends their coverage 
as follows: “The facts are: Hamilton did consider himself a poet; he did see poetry at work in 
mathematics; and he did defend the role of the imagination in science” [Pycior 1976, 38-391. 
2. The present paper adopts the following basic distinction between “conceptualists” and “nomi- 
nalists”: Although both start from the position “that everything which exists is particular,” the two 
groups differ in their account of genera1 terms. “The conceptualist says that a word is general or 
meaningful because in the mind there is a corresponding general concept; he then has to explain what a 
genera1 concept is. The nominalist thinks that the meaningfulness of a word can be accounted for 
without postulating a separate mental entity called a concept” [Woozley 1967, 1991. 
3. There is some controversy over the extent of Berkeley’s departure from Locke’s conceptualism. 
In this controversy, the just-quoted passage has been given a variety of interpretations. Some scholars 
have seen it as major evidence of Berkeley’s revolutionary theory of meaning, while others have 
assigned it less importance. For the latter group, Jonathan Bennett has argued that the passage 
condoned operations on-not a science of-idealless terms [Bennett 1971,54-551. Bennett’s interpre- 
tation is supported by Berkeley’s subsequent remarks that placed algebra in the category of “instru- 
ments to direct our practice . . . [rather than] speculations to employ our curiosity” [Berkeley 1948- 
1957 3,308]. Significantly, the issue raised by Bennett is relevant to the reception of symbolical algebra 
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in the late 1830s and 1840s. when some mathematicians, including Augustus De Morgan, recognized 
symbolical algebra as an art but not a science [De MOJgan 1849, 921. 
4. This new interpretation, of course, does not rule out the tracing of additional mathematical or 
philosophical roots of symbolical algebra. Foreign influences-that of the theory of signs, developed 
by Condillac and other Frenchmen, for example-are possible, but still relatively unexplored. 
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